Some thoughts on Afghanistan

The recent spike in Taliban activity in Afghanistan brings up some interesting things to consider about that area of the war against the terrorists.

First, I have had a question for a couple of months on the command relationships in the country between what the papers call the “U.S.-led coalition” and the separately named “NATO-led forces.” Afghanistan is located with the U.S. Central Command area of operations. CentCom is a specified organization in the United States military with responsibility for East Africa, Southwest Asia (excluding Turkey and the Levant), Central Asia, and the Indian Ocean as far east as the country of India itself, which falls under the area of responsibility of Pacific Command. When Operation Enduring Freedom began on Oct. 7, 2001, Central Command was the lead agency in conducting it and fighting the war in Afghanistan. Central Command’s headquarters is located in Tampa, FL.

In June 2006, NATO forces took over operations in the southeast of Afghanistan. All statements on the activities on these NATO-composed forces have come from Supreme Allied Commander- Europe (SACEUR) in Brussels, Belgium. From what I have been able to gather, the U.S.-led forces and the NATO-composed forces are two distinct entities. My question is: do we have two separate commands under different theater commanders (combatant commander-CentCom, which is US Army General John Abizaid, and combatant-commander-European Command/SACEUR, in the person of USMC General Jim Jones)? If we do have a division of command, is not having unity of command one of the nine principles of war in US joint forces doctrine? I wonder, and I wonder why this would be? To placate European-Canadian sensibilities in relation to our war in Iraq? May be.

While an un-unified command would be a problem in the Afghan area of operations, if this is indeed the case, there is a another command problem that arises. The lead U.S. agency for the war on the terrorist has been designated as U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCCOM). SOCCOM has a world-wide theater of operations in fighting this war. How does this violation of the economy of force, another of the nine principles, affect our efforts in Afghanistan?

These are critical questions to consider in the war and especially in Afghanistan with the Taliban offensive and Allied counter-offensive since June 2006. There are a lot of frictions of war, not all solved by the U.S. theory of Network Centric Warfare and its use of the communications revolution. Unity of Command and Economy of Force are principles for a reason. If we have a divided purpose or confused chain of command under any situation, problems in coordination, policy, and objectives arise. If we don’t follow the economy of force principle, if it is in fact an unstated problem in the war on the terrorist and in Afghanistan, we would be unfocused in our efforts and ultimately dissipate our limited military resources.

About the Taliban offensive, it occurred to me looking at a map and doing a simulated exercise that the Taliban may be putting their head into a vice between the Allied bases of Kandahar and the Kabul-Gardez-Ghanzi triangle. They may be hurt in the short term in coming out to fight. But ultimately if we have a confused way of doing it, which it appears to be the case, we suffer.