North Korea and Nuclear Weapons

[The posting that follows is an extract from an article that will appear in the next issue of The Cepia Club's "Strategy Gazette" on Nov. 1, 2006]

If the Oct. 8, 2006 test of a nuclear weapon by North Korea did indeed happen, then we need to look at some facts concerning nuclear weapons, their politics, and the military policy behind them.

Thus far, only highly advanced, “third generation” industrial societies have had the technology and skills to create a combination of multiple hydrogen weapons small enough to fit on the end of a ballistic missile or into an artillery shell. China is perhaps the poor partner in this type of capability enjoyed by five other existing nuclear powers–the U.S., Great Britain, France, Russia, and Israel. India and Pakistan are reported to have fission weapons, most of which are deliverable by high performance jet aircraft.

It is reasonable to conclude that the North Koreans tested a normal fission weapon, of rather large size, using a shaped conventional explosive charge, in the 20 kiloton range. The North Koreans may not yet have the technology or skills to miniaturize their weapons for delivery on missiles, or possibly even high performance aircraft. They could easily use what they’ve got as a atomic land-mine. Furthermore, after the July 4, 2006, missile test failures, North Korea may not even have a missile capable of delivering a weapon, at least to the United States’ western seaboard. North Korea, if it could miniaturize a warhead for a missile, could conceivably place it on a missile of the proven and rugged SCUD variety which could reach the central areas of Japan (including Hiroshima), and South Korea, China or Russia.

The key questions is: Is North Korea a rational actor who can calculate that self-survival depends on not using nuclear weapons? That is a question that has caused and will cause great debate. The Six Party talks on North Korean nuclear weapons composing the nations of North Korea, South Korea, Russia, Japan, China and the United States seemed to give North Korea the opportunity to stall a resolution until they had a fully functioning and tested nuclear device. While one nation, South Africa, actually gave up nuclear weapons 15 years ago, no other nation that achieved nuclear capability ever disarmed itself. With Iran following much the same suspected, though not confirmed, formula in its nuclear research, the balance of interest in the world of politics has shifted.

First, the U.S. and Japan must continue their collaboration on ballistic missile defenses. Second, the U.S. should fully deploy its own BMD infrastructure and system on an accelerated schedule. Third, there must be a complete quarantine of North Korea–nothing but food goes in, nothing comes out. This includes both a land- and sea-blockade. This option is only possible with the full consent of Russia and China, something that won’t be easy to get. Perhaps the U.S. and NATO could barter time and talks on Iran’s nuclear development in exchange for immediate, powerful, effective action on North Korea. All things being equal, Iran is, hopefully, far away from obtaining weapons, if it indeed desires them. North Korea is also less rational and less sophisticated a society than Iran: Iran could be trusted with a rational calculation of self-survival, whereas Korea’s rationality is doubtful. Fourth, there must be a blanket guarantee by the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain and France in a perfect union of agreement that a nuclear device used aggressively by any nation against a second nation is an attack on all humanity. That declaration would contain retaliation by these permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Fifth, North Korea’s communist leadership and its military must be undermined by covert political means, which includes not-yet-devised methods of espionage, public relations, sanctions, etc.–generally anything that would discredit the communist leadership and alienate it from the world and its own citizens. And, finally, sixth, South Korea must immediately enter into “urgent” talks with North Korea, with the aims of permanently ending the 1950-53 war by treaty, complete demilitarization of both countries, and a feasible, full unification.

These are the first steps to resolution. Many more would probably be needed or feasible.