Vanik Was Example of Congress's Role in Foreign Policy

On Sat., September 1^st,
former Congressman Charles Vanik died at the age of 94. A multi-term
representative from Ohio, Vanik, a Democrat, had one significant, but
forgotten and obscure, role in US Cold War foreign policy during the
1970s. It has a relevance for understanding today's problems.

As the US negotiated withdrawal in
Paris with its Communist Vietnamese enemies in 1972, US credibility
with allies and “moral” deterrence against aggressive Soviet
grand strategy hit Cold War lows. By this time, the Soviet Union
neared phase one completion of ten-year a strategic arms buildup, in
nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and a
global-projection “blue water” navy. This arms buildup resulted
directly from its diplomatic humiliation in 1962 during the Cuban
missile crisis, when a Soviet strategic coup to place medium range
nuclear missiles (the only kind it had) failed in light of US
superiority over long-range ICBMs and strategic bombers. The Soviet
move had failed because the US Navy could keep strategic and
conventional reinforcements from reaching Cub,. And because the US
could ultimately cause more damage to the USSR than the Soviets could
cause America if it became a shooting war.

Once the grand strategy failures in
Vietnam had caused internal turmoil in the US, American domestic
support withered for an aggressive response to Soviet moves in South
Asia, Africa, and even Latin America. Like all nations suffering a
lose of credibility, deterrence, influence, trust, consensus due to
futile a long war, the US by the beginning of the 1970s found itself
on the strategic defensive. Until 1981 and a military and diplomatic
endgame began under President Reagan, US foreign policy reacted to
Soviet initatives around the world, from South and East Africa, the
Persian Gulf, Nicaragua, Poland, South Asia to strategic nuclear arms
superiority, and to the political disunity in the European/North
Atlantic alliance.

When he became President in 1969
promising to withdraw from Vietnam, Richard Nixon and his key foreign
policy assistant Henry Kissinger embarked on a policy of detente
(stable relations) with the Soviet Union. The detente was designed
with “linkage” to issues of US national interest. For example,
in exchange for two things the Soviet Union needed most of all by
1971, credits and loans for wheat and consumer goods, President
Nixon would demand something in return, be it a strategic arms
limitation treaty and a on anti-ballisitc missile systems (to avoid a
costly US military modernization) or political cooperation in ending
the Vietnam War. (The Soviet Union was the main supplier of Communist
weapons, food, and consumer products North Vietanm. In fact, as the
negotiations entered their final 7 month climax, the US bombed and
mined North Vietnam's economic infrastructure and harbors, which put
Soviet ships and citizens at risk. The Soviets did not protest, even
at one point carrying out a summit with Nixon).

The key to Nixon's policy was to
“carrot” the Soviets with enticements for things of no or little
military value, and using a “stick” of costly consequences to the
Soviet Union if the the Communist threatened US vital national
interests. One such “stick” involved a nuclear combat alert for
24 hours during the Oct. 1973 Arab-Israeli war when the Soviets
threatened to go to war with Israel. With the “diplomatic”
deterrence on the Soviet Union between 1972 and 1975, the US bought
itself some critical time to sort out the political, economic, social
and military mess created by Vietnam.

By the time that the detente strategy
completely broke down and the Soviet Union no longer felt restrained
in 1976, the US had given itself four vital years to finish
development and near deployment of new weapons which were not
possible until funding could be found after war in Vietnam. ( The
weapons included: MX, the most imposing ICBM the US ever possessed,
and the Trident missile/submarine system) and conventional weapons
superior to Soviet systems (F-14 Tomcat, F-15 Eagle, M1 Abrams Main
Battle Tank, and the M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle). When the
Soviet Union and its Cuban proxies began to militarily intervene in
Angola, Rhodesia, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Somalia, Nicaragua,
Afghanistan, Poland, El Salvador, and elsehwhere, the US had regained
at least credible and capable deterence with the most modern weapons
to match the Soviet military.

So how does Vanik and Congress fit in?
Since the Soviet arms buildup almost ruined its economy, and by
default its agriculture to feed itself, trade credits and goods had
to be obtained. As Nixon and Kissinger negotiated in 1971 and 1972
for strategic arms agreements, the offer of US Import-Export Bank and
other financial assistance was the “carrot.” In order to obtain
these things at better deals, Nixon offered the USSR Most Favored
Nation trading status, which they sorely wanted. In spring of 1972,
Vanik, along with a fellow Democrat in the other chamber, Senator
Henry M. “Scoop” Jackon, introduced an amendment that would
require any nation (but aimed at the Soviet Union) that sought MFN
status to adhere to emigration under US-imposed quotas for its
citizens and allow citizens to freely leave. The prime target for
Vanik and Jackson was for Jewish Soviet citizens to leave the
country, where presumably most would go to Israel.

The negotiations between the Nixon
Administration and the Soviet Union had been worked out and many
parts implemented. (One humorous event happened to be the Soviet
grain negotiators understanding like Wall Street lawyers serious
loopholes in their grain contracts. In the end, the Soviet Union
ended up buying tens of millions of dollars of US grain at a
little-or-no-porfit discount price for American businesses). The
Soviets did in fact allow some emigration, the ceilings of which were
set in private understandings between the Soviet Union and Nixon. The
only requirement for immigration from the USSR was an “exit tax,”
rather justifiably in place to pay for the free education and health
care (such as it was) provided under the Soviet socialist economic
system. It was the bane of the Jackson-Vanik amendment that the
Soviet Union would place such restrictions on anyone emigrating from
the USSR.

When the amendment was finally passed
with a trade bill in 1974, which President Ford signed into law,
Kissinger feared pressuring the Soviets to concede on an issue of an
entirely sovereign internal matter. While it was perhaps of little
consequence that the MFN status failed to become a reality (it is
conjecture to say that the issue entirely derailed detente all by
itself), Kissinger said of US-Soviet relations, “If Jackson
succeeded in souring the relationship, he was almost certain to
reduce rather than increase emigration. (The Jackson-Vanik amendment
did, in fact, exactly that).” (Kissinger, Henry. Years of
Upheaval. Boston Little, Brown: 1982, p. 987).

The far larger issue in this bit of
history has a relavance to 2007 American politics. Congress always
has had, and as the Jackson-Vanik amendment did show, it can have an
important role in US foreign policy. Sen. Jackson's main motivation
for the emigration amendment was to derail detente since he was, as
manhy old-time Democrats were, a “hawk” on national security.
But even more, Jackson had his sights on the Democratic Presidential
nomination in 1976. As the US sees in the present foreign policy
debate in Congress over the war in Iraq, Congress, on both sides of
the partisan aisle, is prone to play politics on the life and death
matters of war and peace. The 2008 elections, control of both houses
of Conress, and which party will occupy the White House, are clearly
in play in the debate from the beginning in late summer 2002. Perhaps
if Congress exercised its proper policy and funding oversight, and
its checking balance in American government, instead of surrendering
after Sept. 12, 2001, the US might not find itself in the current
predicament of bad war policy, a financial blackhole in the war,
fleeing allies, and confrontational policies in every part of the
world from old enemies (Russia) and new competitors (China).

Can Americans be so cynical of their
fate that they can allow politicians, the professionals of special
interest and personal ambition, to lead US astray for their greed?
Can America find its inspired will to finally find public servants
more worried about good foreign policy, financial responsibility, and
the common good instead of winning elections? If not, America is
doomed, at least in the short-term.

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